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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

# SIMPLICITY *VERSUS* ADEQUACY IN THE DEFINITION OF INSTINCT

## I

THE deniers of instinct, curiously enough, succeed by virtue of certain instinctive logical presuppositions. Scientists are apt to contrast their method with philosophy by the observation that science consists in finding concepts in sufficient number to envisage the realities; whereas it is the ingrained habit of philosophers to outrage the realities by forcing them into *a priori* concepts. This deification of concepts, however, seems to reach its height in recent mathematics.[1] Couturat assures us that definition is the test of reality, not that reality tests the validity of definition. This seems to imply that what we can not conceive can not exist. This device may pass muster in mathematics, in which, perhaps, axioms and postulates are the only realities to which mathematical truth can conform. In geometry, objectivity is coming to mean "freedom from contradiction."

But in physics and psychology, *method* and *object* are not the same thing. *Phenomena* exist despite our inability to define them. Our knowledge *that* we have experience is not dependent on our knowledge of *what* this experienced thing is. Peirce[2] has it that we can not escape a true prejudice because a true prejudice is one whose existence we will never suspect. There are, however, two preconceptions which beset our speculations about instinct, despite the fact that they are notorious in the history of thought. A true prejudice is rather one which we refuse to abandon. There is, first, the hoary conviction that the real is the enduring and *unchanging*. The second preconception regarding the nature of the real is the belief that reality must be simple. The instincts, then, being neither simple nor enduring, can not, perforce, exist.

We do not by any means intend to reject or defend these two criteria of the "real": we only insist that as working tools they do not apply themselves. The persistence of things is relative: how long must a thing endure to be real? Only Platonists require an eternity of unchanging being as a test of "reality." We have at

[1] Henri Poincaré, *Foundations of Science*, 1921, 474–475.

[2] C. S. Peirce, *Chance, Love, and Logic*, 1923, p. 2.

present the gravest doubts regarding the unchanging persistence of even the chemical elements. Perhaps (as Plato in later life came to believe) only the numbers themselves, the alphabet of scientific law, can persist unchanged, thanks to the fact that they are not physically real at all. Then, are instincts unreal because, after years of schooling and effort, they can be conquered, leaving habit fully enthroned? Were the instincts of St. Augustine and Descartes unreal because they could not survive a score of years of battle? On the contrary, the sting of their reality lies in the energy required to conquer them. The inertia of a body in physics is regarded as real on precisely similar grounds. It will repay us to explain in detail the unscientific manner with which recent psychologists have arrived at the non-existence of the instincts. Centrally, their method is, not to arrive at the non-existence of instinct by *inference from the facts,* but by *an application to the facts* of *a priori* principles. Chief of these are the axioms that the real must be simple and persisting. For the sake of brevity, we confine our attention to the misuse of the principle of simplification.

## II

Thanks to the assiduous (and highly valuable) labors of psychologists in the fields of animal and comparative psychology, we have on hand a mass of data regarding the properties of instinct. But, like all vital processes, instincts exhibit the notorious characteristic of *tendency to trait.* The fortunate chemist is able to say of a given mass of matter that it either *is* or *is not* gold, or lead, or iron, as the case may be. This principle of discontinuity is essential to the sciences which pretend to numerical exactness. In logic also this principle plays a dominant rôle as the principle of dichotomy: meanings change step-wise, either completely or not at all, just as an atom releases an entire electron or none at all. Now, if we draw up a list of the properties of instinct, we find that these properties are peculiar to instinct only relatively, and not absolutely. The main "tendencies" of instinct are perhaps the following:

1. The tendency to be inherited (present at birth).
2. The tendency to operate mechanically.
3. The tendency to be set off by perception rather than by idea.
4. The tendency to be highly adaptive or useful.
5. The tendency to exhibit the all-or-none principle (Rivers).
6. The tendency to be accompanied by emotional disturbances.

In brief, every one of these empirical traits of instinct violates our *a priori* requirements for exact definition. Thunderbolts could not be "understood" so long as they divided their allegiance to

two sets of laws: they can not be included in the chapter on electrodynamics until they cease to be weapons of the Gods. So (says Behaviorism) instincts must be resolved to purely physiological or mechanical conceptions or else cease to be "real."

The mechanical is the synonym for persistence and simplicity. The mechanical is that which repeats its states—this is the key to its persistence and simplicity as well. For, so long as we refer to the simplicity of the object, we can not mean the "simplicity" or ease with which we grasp it. Therefore, by the simplicity of nature, we must mean her incapacity of departing from law, not that nature's laws need be "simple" in the sense of "easy." Bertrand Russell well observed that, in this sense, we could never know whether nature were simple or complex, judging from the laws we have so far discovered; perhaps we can discover only the simple (easy) ones. If the phrase "simple nature" is acceptable at all, it must be in the sense that nature will never violate law, though the complexity of her laws defy us forever. This is only our *faith* that nature *can be understood* or our determination *that she shall be understood:* not that our comprehension of nature must be easy. If we wish to apply the principle of simplicity to the *knowing process,* there is a well-known and legitimate manner of doing this. I refer to the law of parsimony ("Occam's razor") which justifies us in choosing between two rival hypotheses which exhibit the phenomena equally well. We are justified in selecting the simpler and easier one. But, if my examination of the work of certain behaviorists is sound, they wrongly misapply the law of parsimony to nature (scientific data) itself; and accept simplicity in this sense as the criterion of reality.

In this regard perhaps A. P. Weiss sets us the best example of what not to do. In drawing up a "set of postulates" for a behavioristic psychology[3] he says, "In the set of postulates which follow human behavior and social achievements are assumed to be forms of motion . . . ; in other words, it is easier to agree on the properties of an electron, or on the nature of motion." If our aim were merely to secure ease, there is yet one other device which Weiss overlooked, and that is the expedient of not thinking at all. We call attention to Poincaré's fundamental warnings against the use of the postulation method, even in mathematics.[4] But the use to which Weiss puts it in psychology reaches the height of futility. Does discussion make any progress when behaviorism bluntly "postulates" that it will not recognize "mental states" as proper concepts in psychology? All we need to complete this farce is to have the mentalists "post-

[3] A. P. Weiss, *Psychological Review,* 32, 1925, pp. 83, ff.

[4] H. Poincaré, *Foundations of Science,* 1921, Ch. 5.

ulate'' that they will not recognize motion as a concept proper to psychology: the contest is only one of lung capacities. A more sensible way of beginning an enquiry is with a *question* rather than an *answer*. We should ask, does the behavior of an organism exhibit anything which can not be rendered in terms of motion? Well, there is the *recognition of motion as motion*. But, to endow motion with the power of self-recognition (and the sensation, perception, and memory which recognition requires) is not to get rid of mind, but is to extend it to the whole universe, an unhappy consequence, in view of Weiss' initial intention of getting rid of it. To prepare a text on motion (which is the subject-matter of physics, mathematics, and chemistry) and label it psychology is violence enough without the further *tour de force* of accomplishing all this by ''postulation.''

To begin by adopting a forced simplicity of postulates in the beginning is only to invite difficulty in the end, because our concepts must ''get along,'' not only with each other, but with the realities. Reflex arcs and motions retain their simplicity only so long as we avoid the reconstitution of human nature out of them. If to find a few simple elements were equivalent to mastering the whole, then every child is master of the calculus by virtue of the fact that it can count. Why do not the physicists (whom we are, after all, so eager to emulate), finding bodies ''too shockingly complex,'' confine themselves to the study of their shadows? We doubt whether science itself forbids this—science is only what we make it. Perhaps it is only the spirit of science—that indomitable will to ''consent'' to nature's complexity, which forbids this forcing of simplicity upon her. A physics of shadows could be simple, so far as it goes. But suppose our hypothetical physicist does not really mean to ignore the other complexities of objects (such as mass, volume, form, color), but that he sought in shadows a ''short-hand'' for them? But it would be simpler to study these other traits, not *via* shadows, but directly. So it appears to me that behaviorism is either blinding its eyes to the complexity of psychological data, or else it is aggravating the very problem it wishes to alleviate, the problem of the ''shocking complexity'' of mind. For I can imagine no hope more futile than the hope that physiological or neurological ''motions'' *are* also our awareness of them. It has been well observed that behaviorism is the product of a certain ignorance of the history of thought. To regard mental states as motions has been the will-o'-the-wisp of philosophers. The study of Democritus, of Malebranche, and of Hobbes will show that no metaphysical project has been so hopeless a quagmire of the recondite and the elusive.

The best minds of history have been brought to dead-lock regarding it. "Thought is the combustion of phosphorous," declared a materialist of Lotze's day. "The burning of phosphorus is a product of thought," retorted Lotze. Weiss, admirably hoping to simplify psychology, is precipitating us into metaphysics.[5]

Watson[6] seeks to find a simple account of emotions in terms of inherited " 'pattern reactions' involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular system." In emotion "the radius of action lies within the individual's own organism; whereas, in instinct, the radius of action is enlarged to such an extent that the individual as a whole may make adjustments to the objects of his environment."

Considering only the terms in which instincts and emotions are here expressed ("pattern reaction") nothing could be simpler. The phrase "pattern reaction" seems to carry with it an atmosphere of tangibility and simplicity which fades wholly away when we try to reconstitute the experience of instinct out of it. To begin with, not even the physical simplicity of such patterns exist. Sherrington [8] clearly regards even the notion of a simple detached reflex as a myth. Donaldson[9] regards the notion of a group of nerve cells functioning alone as without even physiological significance. The pattern-reaction of an emotion will be different each time that it occurs, but viewed subjectively, fear, or anger, or love are unmistakable in their quale. To define the emotion as a pattern-reaction is simply to abandon simplicity for complexity. Just so might the student of the steam-engine, finding the motions of the piston too complex, study in its place the pattern-reaction of the millions of water molecules which drive it. There may be constancy of physiological process if we seek for it, not in the mass behavior of the viscera, but in their chemical processes, and utilize the facts of Cannon and his school.[10] But now we are in another *impasse*, namely, that we can call them "emotional processes" *because we know introspectively that they accompany emotions.*

If we do not draw on introspection for the labels "fear" or "anger" we must either classify emotions on the basis of the objects which arouse them, or else trust to luck. E. C. Tolman[11] well

[5] Not that metaphysics is, as such, worthless.

[6] J. B. Watson, *Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, 1919, p. 194.

[8] Sherrington, *Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, 1911, 115.

[9] Cited by Sherrington, *idem.*, 115.

[10] J. P. M'Gonigal, (*Psy. Rev.*, 27, 1920, 73 ff.) gives evidence of a specific pattern for fear; but Cannon himself (*Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, 1915, 279 ff.) utters doubt.

[11] E. C. Tolman, *J. of Abnormal Psy.*, 17, p. 146 ff.

exemplifies this predicament in his attempt to regard "physiological sets" as "nevertheless primarily identifiable . . . not as physiological but in behavior terms."[12] Here we have but another version of Weiss's attempt to make an identification and still save all the differences. Tolman finds that physiological sets constitute behavior because they are directed to "ends"—flight means getting away from an object, curiosity means manipulating an object, etc.[13] Well and good, so long as we have meanwhile introspected so that we do not label "curiosity" as "flight" by mistake, and provided that physiological sets as such can be "curious," and provided (would it were true!) that when experiencing fear we could annihilate the feel of it by "postulation."

As in the case of Weiss, one of Tolman's motives in offering his psychology of the "slot machine" is to rob the instincts of their variety, which he declares to be "positively shocking" even in "simple nest building."[14] But it is the very simplicity of Tolman's account which is "shocking" to the mentalist. But not even the behaviorist is willing to ignore mental shock in real life with the same lordly disdain he exhibits in his statement of principles. Thus, even Watson, after characterizing emotions as typically useless and insignificant,[15] adds on a later page [16] that, after all, they "remove us from the monotonous level of existence" and make man "a more delightful personality with whom to work, fight, and play." Then, why this enmity against introspective data in psychology? It is certainly not characteristic of physiologists themselves[17] whom behaviorists seek to emulate. Says C. J. Herrick,[18] " . . . neglect of adequately controlled introspective data in a complete survey of the behaviorist's program is unphysiological." He adds that behaviorists should recognize the fact of awareness which is quite different from the behavior of which we are aware. "And in view of the indubitable fact that this awareness is in some of the cases demonstrably a causal factor in the behavior complex, it is bad scientific method to set it aside as an irrelevant phenomenon."[19] To be sure, Herrick accords with Lashley's attack on "dualistic interpretations," but the essential point is that he does not propose to secure a forced monism in advance by postulating the non-existence,

[12] See also his psychology of the slot machine, in his article, "Instinct and Purpose," *Psy. Rev.*, 27, 1920, 217–233.

[13] E. C. Tolman, *J. of Abnormal Psy.*, 17, p. 146 ff.

[14] E. C. Tolman, *Psy. Rev.*, 27, 1920, 220.

[15] J. B. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[16] *Idem.*, p. 224.

[17] With occasional exceptions as in the case of Loeb.

[18] C. J. Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior*, 1924, p. 304.

[19] *Idem.*, p. 303.

or (what has the same effect) the "insignificance" of the introspective data. "Geometry also would be more simple if there were only two dimensions of space, but there *is* the third dimension."[20]

## III

Thus, the principle of simplicity should be used rather to question our answers than to answer our questions. If we merely wanted simplicity, we could always get it by simply ignoring differences. Mach somewhere observes that, neglecting the differences, a penny and the moon are in the same class. Yes, and if we are willing to ignore differences still more, we may enhance simplicity by putting with the penny and the moon, the income tax, ectoplasm, and the art of classification itself.

The author finds that McDougall's account of instincts and emotions exhibits the correct use of the principle of simplicity.[21] There is, first of all, that tenacious adherence to *all* of the facts, as insisted on by Herrick. He recognizes in full, what is so patently true of our experience of instinct, namely, that it is a psychophysical fact. He describes in full the properties of both of its aspects. They have, on the mental side, cognitive, affective, and conative factors. These he examines and reexamines in a succession of chapters. On the physical side, there is the problem of their inheritability, the modifiability of stimulus, and the modifiability of response. To be sure, this does not yield a monism, but it is the only preliminary which can inform us where to look for it. McDougall finds in the central aspect that persisting nucleus which our criterion of reality requires.[22] In vain do we look for the persistence of the identity of the instinct in the stimulus to which it responds, or in the mechanism with which it responds to stimuli. Tolman, seeking to establish instinct as a physiological and neurological set, makes an interesting attempt to meet this problem of what constitutes the persisting identity.[23] He accepts the demonstrated facts to the effect that instincts do vary. He then supposes the existence of a hierarchy of tendencies, so that if a specific response fails, some higher hierarchy intervenes to produce a variation of response. But, if these higher hierarchies are the source of indetermination, they are themselves the essence of the variable; and the "real nature" of the instinct now becomes the *possibility of change.* If all established adjustments fail, this hierarchy gives rise to random movements, which means that the final form of expression into which the in-

[20] H. Driesch, *The Crisis in Psychology,* 1925, p. 119.
[21] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology,* 1918, pp 20–42.
[22] William McDougall, *op. cit.,* p. 35.
[23] E. C. Tolman, "Instinct and Purpose," *Psy. Rev.,* 27, 1920, 220 ff.

stinct settles will be one out of a possible infinity of them. It is quite otherwise if we regard the nucleus of the flight instinct to be fear and its attendant conative and affective qualities. This nucleus is able to gather into one class the endless varieties of instinctive flight as expressed in behavior responses. Synthesis may be the final goal of science, but we get it *finally*, not at the beginning. The progress of science (to borrow a thought from William White) seems to consist in the perpetual postponement of desire to the future.

C. O. WEBER.

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## THE NORMATIVE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND NATURAL SCIENCE

IN two earlier papers[1] I have presented psychology as a science that centers in the study of the sustained life-careers of persons, —in such biographic or biotic narrative as has engaged the attention of Francis Galton, Freud, and Wilhelm Stern. In this account the several methods, schools, and factions of *academic* psychology, to use Thurstone's phrase, bear no direct relation to each other; but each deals with a specific type of problem that springs up in that "biotic" center. These subordinate studies all apply methods perfected in some other field of science, and so in themselves seem no more than a compendium of inquiries *about* human life; but in that central study of sustained life-careers of persons we have data, concepts, methods, and purposes that are distinctively psychological.

In this study of life-histories and life-movement that distinction and separation between description and criticism (evaluation), with which Perry opens his *General Theory of Value* (1926), seems quite inapplicable; here, to describe frequently *is* to evaluate, for success and bafflement, superiority and inferiority, normality and abnormality, are characteristics inherent in the life-movement itself, and appear in the data presented, in the laws sought, and in their application to the betterment or salvaging of individual life-careers.

On the other hand, it seems that evaluation is ultimately always in terms of life-career; "any serious deliberation is . . . a choice of careers, what kind of person one is to become."[2] The great ethical schools of the past were essentially interpretations of salient life-careers,—Buddha, Confucius, Socrates, Jesus, and the saints; democracy becomes an ethics, perhaps, in terms of Lincoln's life, and communism may find a similar centering in Lenin.

But Dewey does not find, apparently, any type of life-career

[1] This JOURNAL, XXIV, Nos. 4 and 5.

[2] Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 217–8.

which is normal or standard: permanence in values arises rather from inertia in society than from some unalterable traits, such as instincts, in human nature itself.[3] With changing conditions all moral principles may become obsolete,[4] and the exercise of intelligence in adaptation seems the one norm or ideal suggested. The situations to which we adapt ourselves are social, and "morality is social."[5]

This reduction of the distinctly personal element in knowledge seems to be the conclusion also of Woodbridge's analysis. "It is this continuity of subject-matter which becomes more and more impressive."[6] The being of mind is "the consequence of the logical structure of existence"; and by "mind" here is meant the body thinking, the attentive individual. In my view of psychological science this is to subordinate the central field of the study of actual life-movement to the study of the configurational structure or *gestalten*, which marks the order of insights through which the person may learn. A Spinozistic spatial "eternity" would in this way swallow temporal phenomena; but in fact it is the temporal which is primary. This is not to confuse logic with psychology, but to note their actual and logical relationship.

This conforming of the individual to external phenomena of one sort or another, this demand for external adaptation rather than internal adjustment, is in contrast with that emphasis upon the personal that marked the thought of William James, who may in this have owed more than we recognize to his European experience and his delight in painting. When we have driven instincts from psychology there yet remains the question whether within the individual unalterable traits exist which may serve as a basis for unchanging moral principles. The question is one of observation and of fact.

Numerous recent studies of notable lives (Brooks, Strachey, Krutch, etc.) evaluate the personal life in terms of inherent worth, in terms of success in strictly personal, internal adjustment, in solving a problem of internal conflict. This problem of internal conflict has, indeed, been the theme of much psychological theory, and has found some place in a theory of values.

The problem is often presented as one of conflicting interests (Perry)[7] or of conflicting wishes. Strictly, we wish or are interested in what we attend to; and we attend to but one object; hence a conflict of interests or wishes occurs only in a metaphorical sense; the reference is to dispositions or propensities that lie latent some-

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 239.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 314 ff.
[6] *The Realm of Mind*, p. 126.
[7] *Op. cit.*

how in the organism, or perhaps press for recognition, thus conditioning attention. So the conflict seems to be between forces that work upon the person rather than within the personal life-movement.

This atomistic and mechanical view of the matter may be overcome if we follow out the thought suggested in my previous papers. The unitary life of the person is known only in movement, not in organic structure. This life is not, then, a Drieschian addition to the machinery of life, but is a movement observed through a period of time and recorded in a narrative. This narrative tells of acts of attention, in which through recognition and expectancy memory organizes and purpose forms.[8]

Two weeks after birth, we have noted, the unitary, unceasing life movement of the individual becomes attentive, and between the fifth and several months of life, apparently, a high degree of "biotic insight" is achieved, and the child begins to live in a world of social recognition. In this field of child biography data accumulate; but, for our present purpose, it may now prove serviceable to turn from this central field of psychological investigation, to renew an analysis of the attentive process itself—a study greatly furthered by James himself, and a proper subject of analytic or functional psychology, —a study of the *constituents* of the life process.

In this analysis of the movement of attention and the sequence of attentive acts we observe that in some cases the tendency is to determine what shall occupy the focus of attention by what now is there: Such attention is intent, imaginative, purposive, and "active." In other cases the tendency is that what is now marginal in attention shall determine what in the future shall be focal. Such attention is alert, perceptive, receptive, "passive." A student listening to a lecture may well illustrate a predominance of either type of tendency, as he fluctuates between following his own train of thought, relating what he hears to that; and following the lecturer's development, reducing his own contributions to a silent commentary.[9]

But in either case the account is inadequate; the attempt to attain and maintain a satisfactory *adjustment of* these two contending tendencies is present more or less in all the students. In an extreme case the adjustment may be made on a basis of sheer docility, the taking down of what is said as rapidly as possible, uncritically, and with the minimum of assimilation. At the other extreme is the thinker who utilizes all the lecturer says, or so much as he attends to, for the development of his own thesis. An intermediate

[8] The movement is observed both by the person himself and by others, with advantages belonging to both types of observation.

[9] *Cf.* Perry, *op. cit.*, §§ 104–108, on aggressive and submissive interest.

type simply enjoys the lecture, relaxed, unimaginative, purposeless, and yet with no docility or appreciation.

In all these cases a solution is presumed. In a few, however, we may find a failure to make personal adjustment. Some, unable to attain purpose, are bored; some, unable to maintain it, are distracted. *Distraction* and *ennui* seem to be the two essential forms of failure in personal adjustment; just as the acceptance of challenge and the relaxation to mere enjoyment seem to be the two essential forms of success in personal adjustment.

Now, with this analysis let us return to the biotic center of psychology and consider in these terms the narratives of life-careers. In the child we readily distinguish the passage from active to passive attention, and note the importance of the corresponding attitudes of play, imagination, and achievement on the one hand, and of imitation, sympathy, and docility on the other. Each of these attitudes may well become charged with one or other of the infantile emotions; and so the effort to maintain between the two tendencies an integrity, wholeness, or singleness of purpose, may become a struggle indeed.

It soon becomes apparent that the essential solution of this problem of personal adjustment is always some form of companionship, real or imaginary. In the society of the adult the same problem appears, and the chief cultural or social forms may all be properly conceived, therefore, as forms of *symbiotic* relationship. The employer and employee, teacher and disciple, artist or scientist and his public, compatriot, friend, and mate, each illustrates in a stable society the general fact or principle of the symbiotic solution of the problem of personal adjustment. We can not understand the enthusiasm of the boy for sport unless we realize that it is the solution of such a problem. Here lies the secret of poetic ardor, also. No subsidiary motive, but the maintenance of the individual life-movement itself, is in question in the effort to integrate attitudes of attention.[10]

Without further elaboration of this general point, then, I content myself with suggesting that, quite apart from theories of instincts or other hereditary tendencies, we have in these features of personal adjustment, in general terms, the possible basis of a true science of ethics or morals. A society is good as it achieves success, and a higher measure of success, in personal adjustments through the establishment of symbiotic institutions and customs; and it may probably be shown that the several forms of symbiosis now current are

[10] From the standpoint here maintained, the harmonization of attentive attitudes is the essential; Perry's harmonization of interests concerns the *conditions*, not the constituents of the life process.

not accidental but essential. A further study should disclose the *stages* through which the child and youth and man should move to achieve the highest degree of success through these cultural forms. So we get nearer to a conception of the normal life-career, as an element in ethical theory.

From this standpoint there is no essential difference between the arts and science, except that in the latter the Terpsichorean feature is totally discouraged if not wholly absent. In the field of configurational psychology, science, like art, seems to be a question of structure and law; but in the field of analytic and functional psychology, which considers the elements of the life movement itself, science is a solution of a problem personal to the scientists engaged; they form a fellowship through which, if rightly organized, individuals harmonize the attitude of docility in subordination to that of challenge and assertion. We have to do here, not with instincts, but with attitudes in attention itself, and with the effort of attention to hold together attitudes inherently adverse. From this standpoint the canons of truth in science are dependent wholly upon the demands of the symbiotic relationship, though it may be bad form, in that symbiotic pattern, to say so. The difference of point of view here is exactly that involved in passing from the analytic functional view of the constituents of the life process to the configurational, "logical" view of the *conditions* of the life process, through which learning and insight may take place.

In this way the element of evaluation that is inseparable from the study of personal life-careers would continually affect our conception of truth and validity in natural science itself—as it always has done, and presumably will do. But, under this variability of detail, the essential function of art and of science would remain constant. For the several forms of symbiotic relationship in family, political, or industrial life, in art (and science) and religion depend, according to this analysis, upon principles inherent in life-careers; and it is always a question, not of relating an act of one person to an act of another, but the life of one to the life of another.

From this viewpoint evil is biotic failure—not only failure in a given effort at personal adjustment, but abandonment of the effort. This takes the forms of *dis*biotic relationships, such as prostitution, or industrial exploitation, or anarchistic impulse; or of merely personal disintegration, as in drunkenness and gluttony, or of psychoses in which an imaginary solution would do duty for a real one.

In the first two papers I endeavored to present a new organization of psychological science which, at first intended as a teaching device, later appeared to be a profitable reconstruction of the science itself. This reconstruction, however, suggested a rather radical

change of our common opinion concerning the relation of ethics to natural science and of both to psychology. In this paper I have tried to face this rather alarming consequence, with the result that the change seems more radical the further I look into it.

Of this reconstructed psychology ethics and logic seem to be subsidiary studies. Whatever permanent principles are to be found in them depend upon their relationship to the solution of the problem of personal adjustment. For ethics, at least, I suppose the advantage to be great; for the possibility of a genuine ethical science becomes for the first time conceivable.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*A Study in Moral Theory.* JOHN LAIRD. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1926. Pp. xxiii + 327.

John Laird, Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy for the past two years at the University of Aberdeen, has given us a substantial book on moral theory. He has formerly dealt in his published writings primarily with epistemological questions and the problem of the self. But in turning in this book to another field he continues to exhibit the same qualities of mind. Two of these qualities are especially characteristic. Always he is sane in his judgments. He begins his treatment of a topic, as did Aristotle often, by examining carefully the beliefs of the "many" and the "wise." He has great respect for the wide-spread moral views of civilized mankind, and refuses to discard the convictions of generations at the behest of the latest *-ism* in psychology or the newest fad in "sociology." He submits the honest beliefs of the "many" to the criticism required by the established results of science, and he profits by sustained reasoning with the beliefs of the "wise." Without any trace of prejudice he none the less feels the weight attaching in moral questions to the accepted "common sense" of thousands of plain but conscientious men. This respect for the opinions of the "many" can be detected at the basis of a number of his carefully stated and critically defended contentions. Thus he argues that in spite of the great complexity of many practical moral problems, we can and often do know what is really right to do; he defends the fact of human responsibility against rash deductions from alleged discoveries in regard to the abnormal, the subconscious, or the impelling force of prerational impulse; and he gives a careful definition of a limited tychism, estimating therein the degree of truth in the popular supposition of freedom and likewise in the common supposition of

constant causal connections in human thought and action. His entire book might fairly be characterized, by borrowing the caption of one of his sections, as the "moderation of the orthodox opinion."

Again Laird shows here even more than in former books the high seriousness or moral earnestness with which he approaches the philosopher's task. He feels the responsibility of venturing to analyze freely the principles of morals. His book would give to students a wholesome sense of the gravity and importance of ethical discussions. It would serve as a tonic to brace one against the ethical indifference of so much current reference to moral principles as "mere conventions." In this respect his book reintroduces one to the atmosphere of the writings of William Law, Bishop Butler, John Stuart Mill, or Matthew Arnold. The zeal of past generations of Scotch theologians seems to lie behind Laird's work.

Laird's book properly professes to be "a study and not a treatise." It is not a text-book: it does not aim to cover the entire field of ethics. Laird is not developing a "system," in the sense of a complete body of interrelated doctrines. He devotes five chapters to the analysis of certain basic ethical concepts, three to psychological questions, one to résumé, two to some social implications of his developed position, and finally one to a few of the broader philosophical questions into which the study of ethical theory leads. It is thus impossible to pick out any single controlling idea from the book. Yet, though space prevents the adequate discussion of the many interesting ideas successively handled, a few indications of the contents and attitude of the book may be given.

Laird takes the subject-matter of ethics to be, not the entire field of goods, but the sphere of human obligations. Many goods which appear in and disappear from our world may be described and analyzed without any reference to rightness or wrongness of human conduct. Ethics is not co-extensive with "axiology," but consists in applying the general science of values to situations in which men are seeking certain goods or trying to choose between rival goods. While recognizing the concept of *good* as logically prior to that of *right*, Laird regards the latter as the prime concern of ethics.

Laird quotes in order to reject G. E. Moore's definition of intrinsic good as something which "would be good quite alone." That concept is too atomistic, and hence is useless for analysis of actual moral situations. In its place he puts the conception of the dominant good "which, irradiating its surroundings, dignifies whatever it reaches" (p. 46). In this connection he examines the customary distinction between ends and means in what is one of the best passages in the book (pp. 44–48). The processes within which ends

and means may be distinguished are of integral character; their moral excellence or lack of excellence must be estimated in the light of their quality as totalities. From this standpoint it is dominant goods, and not Moore's intrinsic goods, that furnish us with the sound basis for our moral imperatives.

Laird's discussion of the possibilities of an ethical calculus is instructive. He defends J. S. Mill's claim that pleasures differ qualitatively, but denies that such a position makes a calculus theoretically impossible. He seeks to establish two main points in regard to a calculus. First "the calculus of pleasures (if there is one) would have to be a part of a larger calculus of values (if there were such a thing)" (p. 113). And secondly there is, if not a strictly numerical calculus, at least "a certain commensurability of values" which is implied in our ethical theories and is indispensable in our moral practice.

In his chapter on the psychology of moral actions, Laird argues against the irrationalism which asserts "that reason is *never* a motive to the will, and even that knowledge of any sort is cold and neutral and powerless." In defending his thesis he mentions as his two most formidable opponents Aristotle and Hume. Both of these writers are, perhaps, in some sense irrationalists. I could not agree, however, that Aristotle is an irrationalist in the sense of one who asserts that reason is never a motive to the will or that knowledge is powerless to influence conduct. Aristotle's statement that "thought by itself moves nothing" does not mean that thought is ineffective or unproductive of consequences in action. Aristotle is, in the section from which Laird quotes (*Ethics*, book VI, chapter 2), discussing how intelligence functions in the moral life. We may seek knowledge about many things which are not objects of human choice at all. "Nothing that is past can be an object of the moral purpose: nobody for instance proposes to have sacked Ilium." Similarly much of scientific investigation is devoted to finding out what is the nature of things, without any supposition of human responsibility for making them what they happen to be. Reason has a moral function only when we deliberate upon "what is future and contingent." Aristotle is here declaring a truth which Laird should recognize to be closely analogous to his earlier contention that ethics is not the whole science of axiology, but the application of our knowledge of values to situations in which men are responsible agents. He attributes to Aristotle the position that "we deliberate in fact only about means and not about ends" (p. 125), and supposes himself to be opposing Aristotle in holding that ends "are the proper objects of moral scrutiny" (p. 126). But Aristotle's

chief aim is to determine through reflection what ends are most worthy of human effort. I suspect—though I can not here be certain—that the opposition between Laird and Aristotle resolves into the question whether the right ends of human conduct are definable in terms of the fulfilment of human nature. At least on this point, rather than on the question of the efficacy of reason, is a real difference. Laird writes in his closing chapter: "If our convictions are not shams, all our directions in terms of value must have an absolute, not a relative, basis. We must seek them, not because *we* are men, but because *they* have dominion within man and over him. On any other theory there are *no* values, but only certain anthropomorphic tendencies and satisfactions" (p. 303). In this passage we see the way in which Laird's affiliations with the "new realism" work out in his ethical theory. He elsewhere indicates that he believes sunsets to be beautiful in uninhabited wastes, and he constantly assumes all values to be exactly what they are no matter whether men are present and no matter what the nature of man is. He would seem to suggest that even in an uninhabited world certain things are properly to be called values, and that the introduction of men into this world would merely put upon them the duty of seeking what had always been of value. This ultra-realistic position may be a result of G. E. Moore's teaching in the *Principia Ethica* that good is an indefinable quality of certain things. Aristotle's ethical theory would agree that values are not matters of passing whims. But he sets forth that the nature of man is part of the objective reality in terms of which values must be defined. Human goods and worthy human ends are what they are because man is the kind of being he is in the kind of a world he is in. There is nothing "subjectivistic" in discovering the dependence of values on a complex set of relationships. And there is nothing of irrationalism in maintaining that reason must estimate the real goods it is our duty to seek by taking into account our own nature as well as the nature of our environment. Laird is opposed to Aristotle, it seems to me, not because Aristotle is an irrationalist, but because Aristotle is, in a certain sense, a humanist. It is most instructive to see in Laird's book some of the implications for ethics of his general epistemological theory.

In his chapter on freedom Laird summarizes and criticizes the recent arguments on both sides. His treatment is admirable chiefly for showing that advocates of both freedom and determinism are extravagent in asserting that their opponents imperil genuine moral responsibility. It is weak in that it avoids entrance into the metaphysical problems which a discussion of freedom really necessitates.

The chapters on the social implications of ethics kill off a number of "sociological" fancies of recent popularity. It is shown that the facts of social morality do not require the concept of a group-mind in any literal sense of the term; that, in spite of the biological value of many social virtues, the good can not be resolved into what has survival-value and ethical conduct can not always be given biological sanctions; that the frequent contentions about the self being selfish or the ego being egoistic are easily analyzable and refutable.

The final chapter seeks to free ethical theory from theological dominance. The reality of values is shown to be independent of any metaphysical assumption that values are "central" in the cosmos, and of any doctrinal stand upon the question of immortality. However conclusive the arguments on these points are, it must be remembered that the opposed position is still held, not merely by thousands of persons who do not read technical philosophical books, but by dozens who do. And the careful attention of Laird's chapter to these problems is thus quite justified.

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*A Theory of Direct Realism, and the Relations of Realism to Idealism.* J. E. TURNER. New York: Macmillan Co. 1925. Pp. 324.

*Personality and Reality. A Proof of the Real Existence of a Supreme Self in the Universe.* J. E. TURNER. New York: Macmillan Co. 1926. Pp. 190.

Dr. Turner, of the University of Liverpool, is of the opinion that the present marked tendency towards realism has not yet gone far enough in its approach towards the naïve realism of ordinary pre-philosophical experience. This thesis is suggestively maintained in the larger of the works listed above. Naïve realism, he contends, is not quite so naïve as it is frequently supposed to be. It is truly critical, though insufficiently so (p. 31), and is characterized by a high degree of logical coherence (p. 66). It is the result of a long process of trial and error, of inference never recognized as being inference, which occurred at a stage so early as to leave no trace in memory (p. 45). It has evolved several ruling principles of capital importance, namely, independent existence, materiality, appearance, and causation, all resting on the one general foundation of an unqualified identity between physical reality and sensed content (pp. 66, 67). This does not mean that the naïve realist fails to recognize any distinction between content as physically real and content as sensed. He makes use of this distinction and differ-

entiates appearance from reality. But despite the distinction he automatically and in a pragmatic or practical way identifies the content as sensed with the content as real, the appearance with the reality (pp. 33, 51). Appearance is to the naïve realist fragmentary or partial reality, and, in so far as he notes any conflict of qualities, he becomes practically a pluralist, perceiving reals rather than a single reality (pp. 51, 52).

Now in Dr. Turner's opinion naïve realism has very considerable philosophic value. It can be so treated as to yield a firm basis for a philosophic *direct realism,* by which is meant essentially the view that the mind perceives real things and their real qualities (pp. 35, 169). Turner agrees with Alexander as against Stout in maintaining that sensa are identical with perceived features of physical existence (pp. 22, 23, 29). He recognizes that every sensed content, regarded as a real physical quality, may be matched by a sensed quality judged to be appearance; but appearance and reality are both modes of being, he claims, the sole difference being that appearance is less complete (pp. 74, 75, 77).

In general we may agree with Dr. Turner in his defense of the knowledge-value of ordinary common sense, or prephilosophical experience and cognition; but it may be remarked that he does not meet fully the difficulties which beset the taking of appearances *in toto* as parts or phases of reality, if by reality is meant that which exists independently of human consciousness. A symptom of this failure to deal thoroughly with the problem is found in the tendency to dismiss with but scant attention "exceptional and difficult cases" of sense-perception (pp. 58, 74). Such exceptional data are the very ones which are most promising of new discovery, as is abundantly illustrated in the history of science.

Having established his theory of direct realism to his own satisfaction, the author goes on to say that so far from this physical realism being incompatible with idealism, it is quite consistent therewith, and finds in it its logical corollary (p. 255). What Dr. Turner means by idealism here is, of course, the objective or Hegelian type, not subjective or Berkeleian idealism. He criticizes the new realists for directing their polemic against the Berkeleian subjectivism as if that were a fair sample of idealism in general, and for failing to apprehend the fundamental principles of the Hegelian system (pp. 13, 14, 255). Hegel's doctrine is more nearly allied to the Platonic than to the Berkeleian idealism; it is objective, but advances beyond the abstractness of the Platonic doctrine of the Idea (pp. 279, 280). When idealism is thus understood in the objective or Hegeleian sense, it becomes possible, in the author's opinion, to subsume phys-

ical realism under it, as one of the "moments" included in its higher synthesis.

Now it must be admitted that the criticism of the neo-realistic polemic is valid in so far as it points out the error of taking subjectivism as an adequate statement of idealism. But when Dr. Turner subsumes realism under Hegelian idealism he does not take sufficient account of the fact that Hegelian idealism includes subjective idealism as well as natural realism in its higher synthesis. Moreover, the dialectic whereby these mutually antagonistic systems are synthesized in objective or absolute idealism is very far from being a necessary movement of thought. It is possible to eliminate some of the features of subjectivism and some of the features of natural realism until the residues no longer contradict each other. When this has been accomplished it will no longer seem necessary to transcend them in a wholesale higher synthesis such as would include them both without revision. Moreover, the resultant view might very easily turn out to be a critical even if still essentially monistic realism, and not the Hegelian idealism for whose security and religious satisfaction the heart at times may yearn. Moreover, no such dialectical short cut as comes by way of a mere synthesis of uncriticized natural realism and uncriticized subjective idealism can be expected to yield permanent satisfaction. Only by a comprehensive synthesis of criticized scientific results and critically established values and what they imply may we look for progress toward universality and stability in metaphysics; and such a system, we may believe, will include neither crude realism nor crude subjectivism. It will, however, include what is left of them when they have been adequately criticized and their mutual contradictions removed by the process of elimination to which we have referred.

In his shorter work, *Personality and Reality,* Dr. Turner undertakes to prove, not the existence of a Divine Being exactly, but the existence of a Supreme Self, such as might possibly and even reasonably be interpreted as God. The "proof" seems to be to the effect that since the material world is purely mechanical, it could not have evolved spontaneously; but that since it actually exhibits an evolutionary process, it must be dominated by something which has the characteristic of inexhaustible plasticity; and we know of no such dominant and plastic principle except a Mind or Self. Perhaps it would be better to call this an argument than a proof.

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*Cosmic Evolution. Outlines of Cosmic Idealism.* JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York: MacMillan Co. 1925. Pp. 484.

The old saying that "a prophet is without honor in his own country" seems to apply, among others, to Professor John Elof Boodin. At least, it appears to the present reviewer that American philosophers have hardly accorded to Boodin's philosophical writings the credit which they deserve. His successive volumes, *Time and Reality* (1904), *Truth and Reality* (1911), *A Realistic Universe* (1916), and now *Cosmic Evolution* (1925), mark the development of a world-view of distinct individuality, in the expression of which Boodin has displayed a singular combination of philosophical thoroughness with strong poetic imagination and solid scientific knowledge—surely, an equipment which should have earned him wider recognition than has actually fallen to his lot. A short notice, like the present one, can hardly hope to do justice to a book of over 450 pages, closely packed with argument. But it can, at least, draw attention to some of the most important points of Boodin's interpretation of the Universe.

First of all, his interpretation of evolution differs in two striking ways from any other with which I am familiar. (1) The usual method is to construe evolution as what Boodin calls a "one-way series." Herbert Spencer, following scientific analogies drawn from the evolution of life on our earth or, at most, from the evolution of the solar system, set the fashion with his formula "from simple to complex." S. Alexander, with his evolutionary series from space-time to deity; Lloyd Morgan with his matter-life-mind series; General Smuts with his ladder of "wholes"—all work to the "one-way" pattern. And Bergson differs from them only in that he has no recognizable order of levels or stages in his "one-way" series. Now, for Boodin, this is an illegitimate expansion of evolution from earthly to cosmic proportions. The universe as a whole does not evolve: it contains within itself all processes of evolution and also of devolution, that may be going on in any part of it. In short, in the universe, evolution is everywhere subordinate to cosmic structure. Indeed, it would have been better if Boodin had entitled his book not *Cosmic Evolution,* but *Cosmic Structure.* For the structure of reality and the way in which it controls any evolutionary process within the whole—*this* is the real theme of his book. And (2) thence follows a further difference between Boodin and other writers on evolution. The others, with the exception of Lloyd Morgan who has God up his sleeve, get over the difficulty of explaining why there is an evolution from one thing to another at all and especially from a "lower" to a "higher" thing, by putting the whole burden on the blessed term "creative" or "creative nisus." Boodin sees that this

is dodging the difficulty. He recognizes that evolution happens by law, not by chance; that there must be a reason for it. His solution is that the evolution of a new, or higher, level anywhere must be due to higher levels elsewhere. "Since in the universe as a whole all the levels of reality may be supposed eternally to co-exist, there would thus be provided the rationale for the evolution in any one part of the cosmos from a lower to a higher level of existence" (p. 36). In his technical language, all evolution is due to "cosmic interaction" and "control," e.g., "it is not by chance that organisms have developed eyes, ears, and other sense organs. Our senses are creative adaptations to specific energy patterns in the environment" (p. 73). So, again, "it is not by chance that intelligence, creative imagination, a sense of beauty, have developed in living matter. They are creative responses to the energy structure of reality" (p. 74). The story of the universe is not the story of a one-way process from chaos to cosmos (by chance combinations of elements and natural selection, but the story of a structure consisting of different levels interacting. Evolution on a lower level is response elicited by a higher level. And God, as supermind, is the highest level of the cosmos.

Such are the dominant concepts of the first part of Boodin's book, which, in the second part, are applied to the evolution of mind and of the "minded (mind-endowed) organism." Here, as in the first part, Boodin works out his argument with a wealth of detailed illustration from the relevant scientific literature. But always the facts are interpreted in terms of his theory of cosmic interaction. Thus, "from an evolutionary point of view, mind is an incarnation due to the interaction of matter in its history with a cosmos which possesses the mental level" (p. 178). Mind is minding—not an abstract "thing," but a way in which the organism "functions." Hence, the Cartesian "bifurcation" of mind and body is an error, and with its abandonment there vanish the familiar epistemological riddles to which it has given rise. The chapters of this part are packed with interesting discussions. E.g., it is part of Boodin's emphasis on the "social milieu" of mind that he rejects the view that we know other minds only by an analogical inference from their expressive movements (p. 205). On another topic, I find, "the great scientist is a poet who restrains his imagination by scientific method; and great art in thought enhanced by emotion. . . . " (p. 230). There is an argument, finally, for immortality. For the supermind, of which our minds are "creative patterns, incarnate in matter," will "conserve the significant patterns" (p. 271).

In the third part, Boodin tries to bring the relativity theory into

his scheme. His actual account of relativity theories (in Chapter VI), is, so far as I am able to judge, as clear as can be given without the use of mathematical formulæ. It is certainly a great deal superior to the ordinary run of non-mathematical expositions. What I am more doubtful about is the relevance of the whole topic to Boodin's theory. The relativity theory arises in the last resort, out of problems of time measurement, and, as Einstein himself confesses, has "no physical significance." *A fortiori*, one would think, it has no metaphysical significance. It owes its introduction into a metaphysical treatise, I suppose, to Boodin's desire to show that there is nothing in its subversive of his doctrine. In fact, it supplies him with the convenient concept of "space-time perspectives" to which the whole of Chapter VII is devoted. This chapter, of nearly a hundred pages, covers an enormous, but miscellaneous, field of topics. It is typical of Boodin's method of giving to scientific concepts a philosophical application that, just as he borrows from the relativity theory the concept of a "field" (or, as Weyl has it, of a cosmic "curvature"), and turns it into his own concept of cosmic "control," so, here, he takes the concept of an event as a juncture, or intersection, of lines of motion and applies it to human life as a "junction of world-streams, travelling in diverse directions and with diverse velocities, but held up for a moment within the field of mind and ordered by the pattern of human experience" (p. 326). So, again he takes the quantum theory and applies it away from its ordinary context of radiant energy to the relation of stimulus to sensation. Or, rather, he claims that this is its original home (pp. 307 ff.) Thence, the argument travels on to particulars and universals; to data (" primary perspectives") and knowledge of data ("secondary perspectives"). Under data, again there is a distinction of "sense-perspectives" and "implied perspectives." Incidentally, there is an excellent discussion of touch; an argument against the privacy of mind as a fiction of abstract psychology; and, lastly, a somewhat startling theory of "consciousness" as universal, i.e., as I understand it, as co-extensive with reality, or as identical with all interaction or response of one element in reality to another. Thus, e.g., a magnet would be said to "be aware" and to "take note" of a lodestone and *vice versa*. Of course, on this view, consciousness can not be the defining quality of mind. The advantages which Boodin claims for this enlarged concept of consciousness are that it saves the necessary concept of unconscious mental processes from self-contradiction, and that it avoids the difficulty of explaining the evolution of consciousness from the unconscious. The last two chapters (VIII and IX) partly recapitulate the fundamental concepts of the whole theory,

with special emphasis on the control of each evolutionary process by the "cosmic whole," and partly they apply these concepts to the interpretation of religion. What is, obviously, here required is a fuller account of God, such as Boodin will, perhaps, give us in a future volume. Meanwhile, there is, at any rate, no doubt that he goes with the idealists in so conceiving the universe that the fundamental values are not subjective illusions, but grounded in the very nature of things. His cosmology is at once a philosophy of science and a philosophy of religion.

For lack of space, I have confined myself to exposition, and held criticism in abeyance. Even such a highly condensed summary will suggest perhaps more questions than Boodin himself could answer. But, at least, I hope to have made good my initial contention that Boodin's work has an originality and freshness all its own. More than that, it is what every genuine philosophy ought to be, *viz.*, a sincere attempt at a synoptic interpretation of the whole of our experience.

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*Volney et l'Amérique d'après des documents inédits et sa correspondance avec Jefferson.* GILBERT CHINARD. (Volume I of the Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Languages.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1923. 206 pp.

*Jefferson et les Idéologues d'après sa correspondance inédite avec Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, J.-B. Say et Auguste Comte.* GILBERT CHINARD. (Extra Volume I of the Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Languages.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1925. 295 pp.

*Pensées choisies de Montesquieu tirées du "Common-place Book" de Thomas Jefferson.* GILBERT CHINARD. (Quatrième Cahier Études Francaises.) Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres." 87 pp.

All three of these largely documentary studies from the hand of the Professor of French Literature at Johns Hopkins relate to Thomas Jefferson, and so derive current interest from the wave of Jeffersonian publications in commemoration of the double anniversary on July 4th, 1926, the centenary of Jefferson's death, and the sesqui-centenary of the Declaration of Independence. The attention of the reading public is upon the "Philosophical Chief of Monticello," if not, perhaps, upon his ideas. The latter have suffered so severely at the hands of his theological enemies and his political friends that they are extremely difficult to recover and to

recognize. This fact makes these extensive first publications of Jeffersonian documents (for they pretend to be little more than that) doubly welcome, even though they contain more pages of French than of English.

Chronologically speaking, the volumes cover three different periods. The little collection of extracts made by Jefferson from *l'Esprit des Lois* covers approximately the years from 1768 to 1772, when the young lawyer of Williamsburg was reading widely, but was more interested in collecting facts than in elaborating theories of the state, a trait which showed itself only a few years later when he came to draw up the detailed indictment of George III. Students of the sources of American political theory have long had their eyes upon Montesquieu. They will be impressed by this evidence of the practicality of Jefferson's approach to his master of *La Brède.* He filled his Common-place Book with Montesquieu's examples, applications, specific cases, but with comparatively few general principles.

Volney's once-considerable fame as the author of the *Ruines* has declined rather than grown with the years. To Professor Chinard he appears as no great intellectual ambassador, but more as an instructive example of a well-balanced travelling observer, *un Français moyen,* neither a fanatical aristocrat nor a Jacobin, who came to America and made an honest effort to understand and to describe the new world. His correspondence with Jefferson took place in the busy years from 1790 to 1805, when the focus of revolution had shifted from America to France, and when American relations with Europe were almost as precarious as they are today.

The Ideologists and John Adams shared the remaining years of Jefferson's epistolary activity until his death in 1826, and it is his correspondence with the former which has the most significance for the history of American philosophy. As Professor Chinard says: "The influence of French thought in the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century is at once undeniable and undetermined." So far, the French have done the greater part of the work. Perhaps M. Fäy [1] will continue his excellent researches into the years beyond 1800. As for American scholars, Professor Chinard points out that the preponderant interest in Montesquieu has brought about the neglect of the influence of the Ideologists and Positivists, which, in the case of Jefferson at least, was certainly considerable. Professor Woodbridge Riley in his *American Thought* has here, as in so many other matters, barely scratched

[1] Fäy, Bernard, *L'Esprit Révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIIIe siècle,* E. Champion, Paris, 1925.

the surface. His successors will find the work of Professor Chinard valuable.

When so many false notions are being paraded as Jeffersonian, and so many stuffed dummies are being held up as veritable images of the founding fathers, it may be well to have a taste of the fine Voltairean flavor in one of his letters to Volney. In the midst of the republican-federal campaign in 1802, when, he wrote, my enemies "exhibit against me such atrocities as no nation has ever before heard or endured. I shall protect them in the right of lying and calumniating, and still go on to merit the continuance of it by pursuing steadily my object of proving that a people, easy in their circumstances as ours are, are capable of conducting themselves under a government founded not upon the fears and follies of man, but in his reason, on the predominance of his social over his dissocial passions . . . nothing being more demonstrable than that he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." [2]

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*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1925–1926.* New Series, Vol. XXVI. London: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 313.

*Methods of Analysis.* Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume VI. London: Williams & Norgate. 1926. Pp. 205.

These volumes contain some distinctly readable material. The articles that seem most definitely to make a contribution are those devoted to logic or scientific methodology, as those by Field and Heath and C. Delisle Burns, and those in the symposium on Universals, and perhaps C. D. Broad's criticism of Kant. Broad's views elsewhere attract the fire of a number of critics, with varying success. A good many points are raised in these papers which might profitably be discussed at length, but we shall not debate them here. On the whole, one gets the impression that the Aristotelian Society had had a rather profitable year, if they took advantage of the opportunities for discussion which these papers afforded.

Since some closing remarks in my review of the previous Aristotelian volume appear to have been slightly misinterpreted, I wish to add a further word of comment. If I may judge by my own habits, philosophers often write short papers about simple questions whose solution seems to them fairly satisfactory. The difficult and controversial matters, on the other hand, whose seriousness they feel most deeply, are apt to be pigeon-holed for more mature consideration before publication. It might therefore be unfair to the Aristotelian members to judge them by what they publish in their

[2] *Volney et l'Amérique*, p. 129.

annual volumes. Nevertheless, we, on this side of the Atlantic, do tend to judge them by what they thus publish, since that is all we have to go upon. And in a similar way do the English judge us, and often unfairly also. I was led to this comment by some very unkind remarks concerning "American philosophers" which I had noted in recent English publications, remarks which I thought much too sweeping and general. I should be sorry if the English judged all of us by some of the things published on this side of the Atlantic. I wished mildly to suggest that there does not exist any such species of animal as "the American philosophers." There exists only a great variety of students of philosophy, various in ability, various in training, who happen to be living somewhere in the vast areas on this side of the Atlantic. I then went on to comment on certain English philosophers. I omitted those now deceased, and those about whom I had not heard much comment on this side of the ocean, though of the latter there are some whom I personally value highly. I tried to give what seemed to me the impression made by the men mentioned upon readers over here. I did not imply this was the one inevitable true opinion: rather the reverse.

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## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. XXXVI, 2. The "Formal Problems" of Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge: *P. A. Schilpp.* Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead: *A. E. Murphy.* Locke's Attack upon Innate Ideas: *S. P. Lamprecht.* Why Scholastic Philosophy Lives: *Virgil Michel.* Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, held at Mills College, California, November 26 and 27, 1926. Discussion—An Organic Superpersonality?: *Virgil Michel.*

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. XXVIII Année, No. 13. Y eut-il une philosophie scolastique au moyen âge?: *M. De Wulf.* Le plotinisme dans le système de Jean Scot Erigène: *M. Techert.* Questions inédites de Maître Eckart, O. P., et de Gonzalve de Balboa, O. F. M.: *E. Longpré.* Bulletin d'histoire de la philosophie médiévale (1915–1925) (suite de fin): *M. De Wulf.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. 34, No. 2. The Interpretation of the Animal Mind: *H. Carr.* The Essential Laws of Learning or Association: *H. B. Reed.* A Formulation of the Practical Assumptions Underlying Psychology: *C. N. Rexroad.* Instinct and Man:

*M. Schoen.* The Recent Anti-Instinctivistic Attitude in Social Psychology: *H. G. Wyatt.* The Freudian Libido as an Incomplete Cycle of Reflexes: *M. F. Fritz.* The Historical Development of Comparative Psychology: *C. J. Warden.*

Bronstein, Leo: Lutte et Reconciliation. Essai sur la manifestation du réel dans l'art. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1926. 370 pp. 30 frs.

Friess, Horace: Schleiermacher's Soliloquies. An English Translation of *The Monologen.* With a Critical Introduction and Appendix. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. 1926. lx + 176 pp. $2.00.

Lucien-Brun, Jean: Une Conception Moderne du Droit. Étude Critique. (Archives de Philosophie, Vol. IV, Cahier III). Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne. 1927. 117 pp.

Nordenholz, A.: Welt als Individuation. Entwurf eines Individuationismus. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. 1927. viii + 121 pp. 6 R. M.

Radhakrishnan, S.: The Hindu View of Life (Upton Lectures delivered at Oxford, 1926). London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. New York: Macmillan Co. 1927. 133 pp.

Rignano, Eugenio: Qu'est-ce que la Vie? Nouveaux Essais de Synthèse Biologique. (Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine) Paris: Félix Alcan. 1926. 208 pp. 20 frs.

Taylor, A. A.: The Negro in the Reconstruction of Virginia. Washington, D. C.: Association for the Study of Negro Life and History. 1926. iv + 300 pp. $2.00.

Webb, Clement C. J.: Kant's Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. New York: Oxford University Press American Branch. 1926. 218 pp. $4.25.

Lalande, André. Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie. Revu par M. M. les Membres et Correspondants da la Société Française du Philosophie et publié avec leurs Corrections et Observations. (Ouvrage Couronné par l'Académie Française) 2 vols. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1926. vi + 1065 pp. 125 frs.

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## NOTES AND NEWS

We learn from the *Revue Neo-scolastique de Philosophie* of the forthcoming publication of the *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* under the direction of Étienne Gilson, professor at the Sorbonne, and G. Théry, O. P., doctor of Theology.

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**Volume XXIV. No. 4. February 17, 1927.**

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